May 5, 2024

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The design of war has changed

The design of war has changed

“World War II ended nearly 80 years ago, but its legacy in defining the strategic vision of the war lives on to this day. Whatever remarkable progress has been made in the areas of aviation, missile technology and space resources, for example,” the meaning of Victory remains unchanged: destroy the enemy and seize or liberate territory. However, every war is unique. There is no greater challenge facing a military commander, in my opinion, than to understand – over time – how war is shaped differently. First, by technological progress, which determines the development of weapons and equipment. Second, by political conditions at home and abroad and the environment. “Economic victory requires a unique strategy and follows a unique logic.”

This is what the Supreme Commander of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, Valery Zalozhny, says at the beginning of his article, in which he presents his strategy for defeating Russia, but also the challenges that hinder his country militarily.

Ukraine must adapt to cuts in military aid from its key allies and focus more sharply on technology if it wants to win the war against Russia, the Ukrainian army chief said. In his CNN op-ed, amid rumors surrounding his future, Zalozny also addressed the challenge of mass mobilization, a source of tension between him and President Volodymyr Zelensky.

The general's article did not mention his relationship with the president. Instead, the military leader sought to build on a quote made in another article published three months ago, as well as comment for the first time on a series of political setbacks at home and abroad.

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In this first article, published in The Economist, Zalozny highlighted the importance of drones and electronic warfare capabilities as a priority for Ukraine, before concluding: “Innovative new methods could turn this war of position into a war of maneuver.”

Zalozny's description of the situation as a war of position — characterized by attrition and immobility on the battlefield — was an admission that the Ukrainian counteroffensive, which began with great expectations earlier in 2023, is essentially over. Expectations were high earlier in the year that Ukraine might go on the offensive and wage a war of maneuver to regain large swaths of territory lost to Russia in 2022.

But extensive Russian minefields and heavy artillery fire, combined with the rapid deployment of unmanned first-person aerial vehicles (FPVs) on the front lines, which make covert attacks more difficult, have proven difficult to overcome.

In the south, the main focus of the effort, Ukrainian forces advanced about 20 kilometers. The hope was that they could reach the coast, about 70 kilometers away.

When Zalozny – in a separate interview at the same time – referred to the situation as a “stalemate,” Zelensky’s office scoffed, saying such a discussion was only in Russia’s interest.

In his article for CNN, it is clear that Zalozny does not see the war situation any differently. But he now clearly believes that Ukraine's military leaders must also take into account a number of frustrations and distractions away from the battlefield. It implies the failure of the United States to agree on a new military aid package for Ukraine, as well as the fact that developments in the Middle East since October have drawn international attention elsewhere. Moreover, “the weakness of the international sanctions regime means that Russia…is still able to deploy its military-industrial complex to seek to wage a war of attrition against us.”

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She doesn't say it in so many words, but the article seems to indicate a growing feeling that Ukraine's fate is ultimately in her hands.

Of course, the self-help attitude is not new in Ukraine.

It has prioritized the domestic drone industry, for example, and has achieved successes in its maritime drone program, striking Russian naval targets in the Black Sea, and long-range drones, flying hundreds of kilometers to strike sites in and around Russia's largest cities. Russia.

But internal problems are clearly troubling, as when Zalozny pointed to the reluctance of his political leaders in Kiev to fully support his call for a larger mobilization of up to half a million conscripts, an admission of the overwhelming superiority in Russian troop numbers.

“We have to realize the great advantage he has [η Ρωσία] “On the mobilization of manpower and how this compares with the inability of Ukraine’s state institutions to improve manpower levels in our armed forces without using anti-people measures.”

He acknowledges that in a society likely reluctant to put large numbers of young men and women at risk, remote-controlled drones offer a more palatable kind of fight. At one point he wrote that technology “boasts an unquestionable superiority over tradition.”

But their importance goes much further, he says, as he believes that unmanned aerial vehicles, along with other high-tech capabilities, have revolutionized not only military operations but the overall approach to strategy.

Only an end to “outdated stereotypical thinking,” he writes, can help modern militaries achieve victory in war.